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Social Costs and the Economics of Cost-Shifting 
 
  For a profit-maximizing firm pursuing a reduction in its 
costs, it is equally "efficient" to: (1) Develop a process 
that will economize on the quality or quantity of inputs 
necessary to produce a given level of output; (2) Purchase the 
same quality and quantity of inputs at a reduced price; or (3) 
Adopt a new process that shifts a portion of the firm's 
production costs to some other person, entity, or the 
environment. 
  When economists speak of "technical change" the first of 
these approaches is almost always implied.  The second is, to 
a degree, covered when the analysis of "factor markets" is 
covered.  The third option, cost-shifting, is almost always 
downplayed or neglected.1  Despite its neglect by professional 
economists, cost-conscious firms have been most attentive to 
the possibilities of cost-shifting.  It follows that 
economists' tendency to neglect this variety of cost savings 
is unwarranted. 
  As an example, consider a situation in which some unique 
characteristic of a workplace necessitates the wearing of a 
specialized garment.  Examples may include a protective suit 
in the case of a hazardous workplace, or an idiosyncratic 
costume that "fits" with the theme of a restaurant or place of   3
entertainment.  Now, further suppose that this industry's 
conventional practice is that changing into and out of these 
specialized garments takes place on company time.  Clearly, if 
the firm can modify this convention to one in which employees 
change on their own time, then a savings on labor cost can 
accrue to the firm.  Naturally, employees and employers will 
disagree on the merits and desirability of such a modification 
of the workrules.  Moreover there is no obvious "resolution" 
to this quandary, other than what follows from the bargaining 
process.2  Unless the labor market approximates the specific 
and largely implausible qualities of "perfect competition," 
the outcome will be subject to the vicissitudes of relative 
bargaining power (Prasch 1995). 
  The problem, as K. William Kapp, James Swaney, and Martin 
Evers have argued, is that cost-shifting is, and must be, 
endogenous to a competitive, for-profit, market system (Kapp 
1971; Swaney and Evers 1989; Swaney 1987).  Entrepreneurial 
firms that are successful in shifting the costs and risks 
associated with production to consumers, labor, the 
environment, or the government (through special tax 
considerations, wage subsidies, etc.), will gain a competitive 
advantage over their competitors (Prasch 1997, 2002, 2004b).  
Success in shifting costs and risks to third parties will 
pressure a firm's competitors to imitate its "innovations," or 
face the competitive struggle at a marked disadvantage.  
Absent effective regulation, what results is a competitive 
process of "destructive competition" (Culbertson 1985).   4
  With labor, the locus of the problem is that to a private 
firm the cost of hiring labor is a per-unit accounting cost.  
Today's economists, taking as they almost always do the 
perspective of the business firm, categorize labor as a 
"variable cost."  Yet from the perspective of society, labor 
is an overhead cost.  This divergence between the firm's and 
society's perspectives on the cost of labor was once widely 
understood and discussed in the economics literature.  
Institutionalists invoked this distinction when they referred 
to the "Social Cost" of Labor, or the "Social Overhead Cost" 
of Labor (Kapp 1971; Clark 1923).  Consider, for example, the 
following comment by Richard Lester: 
 
In a market economy only money costs count; human 
costs, such as unemployment through displacement by 
labor-saving machinery, or deformed bodies and 
stunted minds resulting from child labor, work 
injuries, and occupational diseases, do not affect 
economic action and policies unless they somehow 
enter money costs (Lester 1947, 42). 
 
  Social Costs, and the economics of cost-shifting, have 
been lost to economics (environmental pollution represents a 
unique exception).  The reason is that it is presumed, 
although rarely argued, that market societies are 
characterized by perfect information with a full set of "spot" 
and "futures" markets.  These are -- again it is presumed -- 
embedded in a complete definition of property rights.3  
Additionally it is assumed that there is costless contracting 
between all market participants.  Under these conditions,   5
cost-shifting without compensation can not readily occur.  
Confusing this idealized model with things as they are, 
today's economists have simply dropped the concept of labor's 
social cost (feminist economists are an important exception to 
this generalization). 
  A second reason for professional neglect of social costs 
is that economists have been, despite their stated denials, 
rather optimistic about the moral sentiments of the owners of 
firms.  This implicit belief in the high moral standards of 
business owners is, to be sure, a deviation from their often-
professed adherence to the proposition that business owners 
single-mindedly pursue their own self-interest.4  Happily 
these economists have, if only accidentally, stumbled across a 
more accurate understanding of humanity.  Studies by 
experimental economists, social psychologists, and others have 
consistently affirmed that our motives are generally a blend 
of multiple agendas.  That said, competitive pressures can, 
and periodically do, overwhelm people's moral inhibitions.  It 
follows that moral constraints cannot be exclusively relied 
upon to end the shifting of costs and risks. 
  Another institution that undermines the ethical 
foundations of modern commerce is the corporate form of 
business organization.  In addition to their legal and 
corporeal differences from actual persons, corporations are 
different in that they, by law, custom, practice, and imposed 
workplace norms and incentives, rarely exhibit the multiple 
agendas that are normally evident in a mature and properly   6
socialized adult.  This, of course, is a competitive advantage 
to the corporation as it single-mindedly pursues its "bottom 
line."  A self-interested proprietor, with a normally 
functioning conscience and social status in her community, 
might balk at the shifting of certain costs or risks onto her 
neighbors.  This conclusion is, perhaps, less of a surprise 
when we consider that even as the dispersed ownership of a 
corporation diffuses financial risk, it also diffuses moral 
accountability (Bakan 2004; Eeghen 1997). 
 
Social Costs and Economic Theory 
 
  Things wear out.  Knowing this, responsible firms and 
homeowners plan for the expenses associated with maintenance 
and depreciation.  Over the past forty years Americans have 
come to believe that they can no longer assume that the 
environment will regenerate itself under any and all 
conditions.  This realization has created and sustained 
political pressures for improved stewardship of the nation's 
environment. 
  Likewise, a nation's labor force and citizenry must be 
maintained.  To society, this is an overhead cost.  Moreover, 
this maintenance inevitably comes at someone's expense -- 
typically from the resources of the individual laborer with 
periodic assistance from family or friends.  Classical 
economists clearly understood that labor, considered as a 
resource, had to be maintained.  This idea was reflected,   7
however imperfectly, in their notion of a "subsistence wage."  
The Institutionalist school retained and built upon this idea.  
They believed that labor had a distinct social cost, one that 
could, they argued, be estimated with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy. 
  The Neoclassical school, with its unique emphasis on 
methodological individualism, dropped such concerns.  The 
Neoclassical theory thereby bypasses the Classical and 
Institutionalist idea of society and the economy as "ongoing 
concerns" that had to be reproduced from period-to-period.  
Starting from a static theory of "choice," Neoclassical 
economists depicted labor as arriving in the market in each 
and every bargaining period with whatever economic capacities 
it happened to possess.  In parallel to its static image of 
the consumer, with his or her fully formed and articulated 
"preferences," the Neoclassical school took the skills, 
attributes, and abilities of labor as an unproblematic 
"endowment." 
  Of course, the Neoclassical rejoinder to the existence of 
unmet needs on the part of the workforce is that firms could 
be made to account for them through the wage-demands made by 
workers who, as rational beings, will account for the full 
costs of their own maintenance when they make their wage 
bargains.  Underlying this assertion is the belief that (1) 
labor is a commodity not inherently different from any other 
commodity, and (2) that the market structure termed "perfect 
competition" is applicable.  The first of these assumptions   8
has been addressed elsewhere (Prasch 2004a).  As to the 
second, the notion of perfect competition, by design, 
explicitly devalues issues related to relative or asymmetric 
bargaining power.  Yet it is evident that the labor market, 
and in particular the market for unskilled labor, is anything 
but a perfectly competitive market.  Transportation costs, 
differential information, the relative neediness of employees, 
the level of unemployment, etc., each and severally act to 
undermine the bargaining power of labor (Lester 1947, Ch. 15; 
Prasch 1995). 
 
Society and the Economy as Ongoing Concerns 
 
  As mentioned, the idea of a social cost of labor embodied 
the dual idea that the economy, and the society within which 
it was embedded, were ongoing concerns that are costly to 
maintain.  This idea suggests two inferences.  First, that a 
failure to sustain labor, while possibly to the immediate 
advantage of individual firms, could be a more expensive 
choice when viewed from a societal perspective (Clark 1923).  
The second is a more controversial idea from the perspective 
of Nineteenth century liberalism.  This is the idea of 
sustainability, which implies that there is at least one value 
that exists independently of, and perhaps in opposition to, 
market prices.  Should market prices fail to support 
sustainability, a case could be made that the government has 
grounds to intervene in the market.  Specifically it could   9
either: (1) modify market prices to more accurately reflect 
the needs of society, or (2) provide for unmet social needs 
out of direct expenditures.  Social overhead costs, to 
reiterate, imply that there are social values distinct from, 
and potentially in conflict with, market values.  Such a 
perspective is clearly in conflict with the Neoclassical 
vision that considers all values, other than market prices, to 
be inessential to economic analysis.  This eradication of non-
market concerns from the realm of professional concern or 
consideration is presented, not as a gap or oversight, but as 
a sign of the maturity and scientific status of economic 
reasoning (Prasch 2003). 
  In opposition to the Institutionalists, Neoclassicals 
have argued that freely-formed market prices were essential to 
the organization and structure of the market.  From this 
perspective, market prices are the best period-by-period 
"signal" of the state of supply relative to demand in each and 
every market.  Such valuable information, reflecting as it 
does the most important attributes of an unfathomly complex 
system, can not be recreated or deduced by any outside 
observer, no matter how well informed (Hayek 1945). 
  This vision of the information content of free-market 
prices sets aside the fact of their often-extreme contingency.  
This contingency follows from past or present decisions with 
regard to property law, contract law, current and future 
expectations, distribution of income, norms, habits, whimsy, 
fashion, etc.  By contrast, a social value such as   10
sustainability can, to the extent that social overhead costs 
are well-described and articulated, convey a concrete meaning 
that transcends such epiphenomena.  This matters because 
people, people with lives and needs, must meet their needs in 
each and every "short run."  The social overhead costs of 
labor must be met if the economy and society is to be 
sustained: 
 
There are costs of institutional relief to be borne 
if maintenance is not met, and much larger losses in 
productive efficiency.  Without attempting to define 
just where this line comes, we can be quite sure 
that the laborer does not avoid the cost of 
maintenance by sleeping on a park bench and living 
on fifteen cents a day; he deteriorates and both he 
and the community bear the cost of the deterioration 
(Clark 1923, 362). 
 
  Sentiments such as John Maurice Clark's were the 
foundation of the Progressive Era's critique of "sweatshop" 
labor (Power 1999; Prasch 1998).  By hiring employees at less 
than their replacement cost, a parasitic firm was thought to 
be the beneficiary of a direct or indirect subsidy from the 
larger society.  Shifting some of the costs of maintaining its 
labor force onto the larger society, a firm can incur a 
tangible advantage over its rivals.  For a firm's employees to 
survive with wages below subsistence, they would have to draw 
upon previous savings, or receive some variety of transfer 
from family members, private charity, or the state.  Should 
the social overhead costs necessary for a "decent" standard of   11
living not be met from any source, society would still have to 




  Regrettably, none of the negative consequences outlined 
above are a direct concern to a cost-cutting firm.  One reason 
is that its employees are only a small portion of the labor 
pool of a given city or region.  This characterization is 
particularly true for those firms that hire unskilled labor.  
In addition, the firm's rate of discount can generally be 
assumed to be higher than that for society as a whole, 
implying that they are less interested in the long-run 
degradation of the workforce. 
  Beyond these considerations, a larger conceptual problem 
is that for several decades economic theorizing has been 
caught up in what we might usefully label a "shopkeeper" 
perspective.  It is this perspective, enshrined in the 
textbooks, that takes labor to be a "variable cost."  For the 
business firm, and only the business firm, is this true.  For 
society, the health and welfare of its citizenry are clearly 
"social overhead costs."  From this latter, social, 
perspective it is almost self-evident that the purpose of the 
economy is to support a vibrant society (Polanyi 1944).  This 
position can be usefully contrasted with the politics of 
Neoliberalism, which insists that it is society's role to 
support the economy.   12
  The idea of labor's social overhead cost, if revived, 
presents us with an underlying logic of labor market 
regulations.  Laws concerning wages, hours, health, or safety 
may still, of course, be criticized for being misspecified or 
ineffective.  However, acknowledging the existence of a social 
cost of labor means that they can not be considered, ipso 
facto, to be "distortions."  On the contrary, they represent a 
civilized society's response to the inevitable limitations of 
relying solely on market prices to ensure the sustainability 
of the economy, society, and polity.  The political 
philosopher Harold Laski nicely summarized the issue, "Factory 
Acts, Trade Boards, and the like were all the logical outcome 
of laissez-faire; it is because without them the community 
would have found a civic life impossible to the vast majority 
of its citizens" (Laski 1931, 487). 
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Notes 
 
1. James Swaney and Martin Evers have suggested that it would be useful to 
distinguish "between mere technical advance, where costs are shifted, 
resulting in total social opportunity costs that are no lower (and may be 
higher), and true technological advance, where costs are reduced for society 
as well as for the micro-unit" (Swaney and Evers 1989, 29n.6). 
 
2. An exception occurs in the event that the minimum wage law 
is binding.  In such a case the state may intervene to ensure 
that "off the books" labor-time is not used to reduce the 
effective wage below the legislated minimum. 
 
3. What, exactly, a "complete set" of property rights and 
markets might mean in a world characterized by 
entrepreneurship and technological change has never been given 
a satisfactory explanation. 
 
4. Some economists reconcile these notions by proposing the 
existence of "reputation effects" or "enlightened self-
interest," but I nevertheless stand by the statement in the 
text.  Oliver Williamson is perhaps exceptional in his clear 
depiction of predatory behavior ("opportunism") as being a 
core characteristic of self-interest (Williamson 1985, Chs. 1-
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